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Abstract
The nine papers in this special issue focus on network infrastructure configuration and some of the problems
encountered in the areas of specification, diagnosis, repair, synthesis, and anonymization.
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omponent configuration is the “glue” for logically inte-
grating network components to set up end-to-end require-
ments. Requirements can be on security, connectivity, per-
formance and reliability. Each component has a finite number
of configuration parameters that are set to definite values to
satisfy requirements. Today, the large gap between require-
ments and configurations is manually bridged. This leads to
large numbers of configuration errors whose adverse effects on
availability, security, performance and deployment costs are
well documented. For example, in his 2004 paper Computer
Security in the Real World, Turing Award winner Butler
Lampson stated that “setting it [security] up is so complicated
that it’s hardly ever done right. While we await a catastrophe,
simpler setup is the most important step toward better securi-
ty.” As if to corroborate this concern, in late 2008, a govern-
ment report Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency
states that “incorrect configurations … were responsible for
80% of Air Force’s vulnerabilities.” A 2008 report from
Juniper Networks What’s Behind Network Downtime?
Proactive Steps to Reduce Human Error and Improve
Availability of Networks states that “human error [arising out
of network complexity] is blamed for 50 to 80 percent of net-
work outages.” 
Thus, it is critical to develop tools to automatically bridge
the gap between requirements and configurations. The funda-
mental problems that need to be solved to build these tools are:
• What are the primitive requirements and how are they
composed into end-to-end requirements? 
• What are formal languages for specifying requirements? 
• How does one formally verify requirements? 
• How does one synthesize correct configurations from
requirements?
• How does one diagnose and repair configuration errors?
• How does one visualize logical relationships set up via
configuration?
• How does one anonymize configuration so that the new
configuration does not reveal sensitive information yet
permits researchers to gain insights into how configura-
tions are deployed in practice?
• How does one migrate current configuration into final
configuration without disrupting mission-critical servic-
es or creating security breaches in the transition? 
• How does one test components for whether their config-
urations have been correctly implemented? 
and especially
• How can specification languages be made easy to use by
network administrators? Unless requirements are pre-
cisely specified, configuration synthesis, migration plan-
ning and a substantial amount of diagnosis and repair
are impossible. 
Answering such questions is inherently hard. Requirements
span multiple components at and across multiple protocol lay-
ers. A real infrastructure typically contains thousands of com-
ponents, each with hundreds of configuration parameters.
Compounding the challenge is the fact that security interacts
with connectivity, performance and reliability. Security is
about preventing undesirable behavior while others are about
enabling good behavior. Incorrect resolution of this tension
can disable mission-critical services and potentially cause as
much harm as allowing adversary access to those services.
Security and connectivity are often handled by different parts
of an organization, and it is not straightforward to share con-
figuration information for end-to-end analysis. Components
can work correctly in isolation but not together to support end-
to-end services. One cannot diagnose configuration errors by
checking component configuration in isolation from that of
others. This is because the logical structures into which these
have been integrated, via configuration, are broken. Global
reasoning is required to check these structures. For the same
reason, configuration repair is hard: changing the configura-
tion of one component to restore a requirement may violate
another requirement. The change has to be such that all
requirements are simultaneously true in the new configuration,
not just the falsified one. Avoiding single points of failures
requires not only correctly provisioning redundant resources
and fault-tolerance protocols at a single layer but also ensuring
that these resources are not mapped to the same resource at a
lower layer. Even if the final configuration is known, incre-
mentally changing current configuration to final without vio-
lating security and functionality invariants is a hard AI plan-
ning problem. Convincing administrators that revealing
anonymized versions of their configurations will not invite
new attacks is an open problem. Network administrators are
often not computer scientists so getting them to adopt formal-
ized languages is not straightforward. 
This issue brings together nine papers that address some of the
above problems in the areas of specification, diagnosis, repair,
synthesis and anonymization. We received 37 papers in total. 
The first paper by Urushidani, Abe, Ji, Fukuda, Koibuchi,
Nakamura, Yamada, Shimizu, Hayashi, Inoue, Shiomoto
“Design of Versatile Academic Infrastructure for Multilayer
Network Services” provides a concrete description of configu-
ration challenges on a large scale. It describes the design and
deployment of SINET3, the new Japanese academic infra-
structure providing multi-layer network services to more than
700 universities and research institutions. 
The second paper (invited) by Bellovin and Bush
“Configuration Management and Security” focuses on the
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challenges of configuring security in a large, heterogeneous
environment that includes firewalls, servers, desktops and
PDAs. This challenge is compounded by the interaction
between security and business policy and by continuous
attempts by “enemies” to subvert configurations where enemies
could include benign insiders frustrated by security policies. 
The third paper by Pappas, Wessels, Massey, Terzis, Lu and
Zhang “Impact of Configuration Errors on DNS Robustness”
quantitatively documents the impact of configuration errors on
reliability of the critical DNS infrastructure. This infrastruc-
ture is highly resilient to server failure but only under the
assumption that servers fail independently of each other. The
paper shows how configuration errors violate this assumption
and thereby significantly compromise this infrastructure’s
resilience. 
The fourth paper by Lee, Wong and Kim “NetPiler: Detection
of Ineffective Router Configurations” presents a method of iden-
tifying BGP routing policies that are “ineffective” in that their
removal will not change network behavior. These could either be
removed to simplify policies or be repaired to restore network
administrator’s intent. This method was evaluated with configu-
rations from large ISPs and a university network and identified
roughly a hundred misconfigurations. 
The fifth paper by Al-Shaer, El-Atawy and Samak
“Automated Pseudo-Live Testing of Firewall Configuration
Enforcement” addresses the problem of checking whether fire-
wall policies have been correctly implemented. Starting from
the firewall policy, the paper describes an algorithm to gener-
ate a set of test cases that test for common errors arising in fire-
wall implementation, e.g., in rule ordering. It has been evalu-
ated on firewalls with about 25,000 rules. 
The sixth paper by Homer and Ou “SAT-Solving
Approaches to Context-Aware Enterprise Network Security
Management” describes not only how to diagnose configura-
tion errors but also how to optimally repair these. It exploits
properties of minimum cost SAT solvers and of proofs in the
logic-based language called Datalog. 
The seventh paper by Enck, Moyer, McDaniel, Sen, Sebos,
Spoerel, Greenberg, Sung, Rao, Aiello “Configuration
Management at Massive Scale: System Design and
Experience” addresses the problem of requirement specifica-
tion and automated configuration synthesis. It defines active
templates called configlets whose output can be spliced into a
native configuration file thereby reducing the need for admin-
istrators to learn a fundamentally new specification language. It
has evolved over five years of use in a large enterprise network. 
The eighth paper by Wang, Avramopoulos and Rexford
“Design for Configurability” addresses the configuration syn-
thesis problem. It presents a system for fine-grained control
over interdomain routing policies that is not possible with the
current BGP policy language. Specifically, it allows one to
express tradeoffs between different BGP policy objectives.
The tradeoff is expressed not by a step-by-step ranking of BGP
attributes but more naturally by weighting competing objec-
tives within the Analytic Hierarchy Process framework.
The ninth paper by Maltz, Zhan, Hjalmtysson, Greenberg,
Rexford, Xie and Zhang “Structure Preserving Anonymization
of Router Configuration Data” is based on the observation that
enterprises tend to be less secretive about their network’s
structural information than they are of their identity.
Fortunately, the structural information is also of greatest inter-
est to networking researchers. The paper proposes an algo-
rithm to preserve structural information while anonymizing
identity information. 
We are grateful to Martha Streenstrup, the issue mentor,
Laurel Greenidge and Sue Lange of IEEE and the panel of 61
reviewers for their time, expertise and counsel in the prepara-
tion of this issue. 
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